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Abstract—Natural gas and electricity systems are becoming 
increasingly strongly coupled. Gas-fired units (GFUs) are re-
placing retired coal plants, and the power systems are more de-
pendent on the flexibilities provided by GFUs. The GFUs’ power 
generation capability relies on the availability of gas resources, 
which is jointly determined by the capacity of gas suppliers and 
pipeline networks. However, the gas and electricity markets are 
operated separately. Consequently, the GFUs are forced to “rep-
resent” the entire power system to bid on the gas market: they 
must make forecasts regarding future gas consumption and bear 
the risk of improper contracts or being unable to meet generation 
schedules due to occasional insufficient gas supply. When facing 
larger shares of renewable energies and more-frequent gas net-
work congestions, the current market framework is particularly 
unreliable and inefficient, as well as economically unfriendly to 
the investors of the GFU assets. In this paper, we try to develop a 
framework that can combine the two markets. By properly pric-
ing the scarce resources, e.g., gas transmission capacity, the joint 
market can help allocate the resources more efficiently while 
satisfying the demands. Moreover, a more forward-looking 
day-ahead market clearing framework is presented by consider-
ing the uncertainty brought by renewable energies. The formula-
tion and algorithm of the proposed joint market model will be 
presented, as are some case studies. 
Index Terms— day-ahead market, gas and electricity coordi-
nation, wind power, unit commitment, stochastic programming.1 
NOMENCLATURE 
A. Indices, parameters, sets and functions 
𝜆𝑁𝐺 , 𝜆𝑒 Value of lost natural gas and electric load. 
𝜔, 𝛺 Index and set of the scenarios. 
𝜌 Weight of the scenarios. 
𝜙𝑔(∙) Bus where a unit is located. 
𝜙𝑤(∙) Bus where a wind farm is located. 
𝜃(∙) 
Gas consumed by a compressor as a function of power 
output. 
Ψ(𝑛) Set of gas system nodes that are connected to node n. 
Ξ(𝑛) Set of gas suppliers that are located at node n. 
Λ(𝑛) Set of gas loads that are located at node n.  
Ω(𝑛) Set of gas-fired units that are connected to gas node n. 
Φ(𝑛) Set of gas compressors that take gas from node n. 
Υ(𝑔) Power system node at which a unit is located. 
𝛤 Generation shift factor matrix. 
𝑎𝑐𝑜𝑚 
Parameters of the gas consumption function of a compres-
sor. 
𝐁𝐿 , 𝐁𝐺𝐹𝑈  Gas node to gas load and gas-fired unit incidence matrix. 
𝐶𝑢, 𝐶𝑑 Startup and shutdown costs of a unit. 
d, D Index and set of the gas loads. 
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𝑓(∙) Piece-wised generation fuel cost function of the units. 
𝑓𝑛𝑔(∙) Piece-wised fuel characteristics of the gas-fired units. 
G, G, Gng Index and set of conventional and natural gas units. 
?̅?, 𝐻 Maximum and minimum power output of a compressor. 
𝑖, 𝐼 Index and set of the added gas transmission feasibility cuts.  
j, J Index and set of natural gas suppliers. 
k, W Index and set of wind farms. 
l, L Index and set of natural gas loads. 
𝐿𝑒 , 𝐿𝑁𝐺 Electricity and natural gas load profiles. 
m, M Index and set of power system nodes. 
n, N Index and set of gas system nodes. 
𝑃
𝑔
, 𝑃𝑔 Maximum and Minimum output of a unit. 
𝑃
𝑤
 Available wind power. 
q, Q Index and set of power transmission lines. 
𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑝 Ramping rate limit of a unit. 
𝑆̅ Maximum capacity of a gas supplier. 
𝑡, T Index and set of time periods. 
𝑇𝑜𝑛, 𝑇𝑜𝑓𝑓 Minimum on and off times of the units. 
B. Variables 
𝜋 Gas pressure at a gas network node. 
ζ 
Value of natural gas to the power system implied by the 
locational marginal electricity price. 
𝜂𝑒  Locational marginal electricity price. 
𝜂𝑛𝑔 Gas price. 
𝜂𝑛𝑔,𝑐𝑎𝑝 Locational gas capacity price. 
𝜀 Marginal gas consumption rate of a unit. 
𝑣𝑢, 𝑣𝑑 {0,1}, startup and shutdown state variables of a unit. 
𝑣 {0,1}, on/off state variable of a unit. 
ℎ Power output of a gas transmission compressor. 
∆𝑙𝑁𝐺  Scheduled gas load shifting. 
∆𝑙𝑒 Scheduled electricity load shifting. 
𝑝 Scheduled output of a unit. 
𝑝𝑤 Scheduled output of a wind farm. 
𝑠, 𝑠0 Scheduled output of a gas supplier. 
𝑤 Gas consumed by a GFU. 
𝑥 Booked gas transmission capacity by a GFU. 
𝑦 Gas flow in a gas transmission branch. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ccording to the Energy Information Administration [1], 
the share of gas-fired units (GFUs) in the U.S. electricity 
supply has increased since 2001, reaching a historically high 
level of 32.7% in 2015. At the same time, the power sector 
consumed 35.4% of the annual natural gas supply, compared to 
30.7% in 2010 and 22.3% in 2000. The two systems have never 
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been as strongly coupled as they are today, and this trend is 
continuing. The Paris Protocol is believed to have accelerated 
the retirement of coal plants. From both the environmental and 
economic perspectives, GFUs, which have a lower CO2 emis-
sion rate than coal plants, are among the best substitutes.  
Moreover, the deepening penetration of wind and solar 
power has put increasing pressure on the operational flexibility 
of power systems. In additional to GFUs, flexibility can also be 
provided by electric storages and hydro units. However, storage 
systems are still expensive, and hydro reservoirs are not always 
available. GFUs have comparative advantages in this context. 
The International Energy Agency has predicted that GFUs will 
become more attractive as the share of wind increases [2]. 
GFUs act as the interface of gas and power systems. The 
supply, demand and network capacity of one system may have 
impacts on the other system via GFUs. However, the two sys-
tems are largely operated independently at present [3]. Even in 
the most de-regulated environment, each of the two markets is 
cleared given the status of the other as boundary conditions [4], 
which are actually determined by the GFUs. GFUs sign con-
tracts in the gas market based on their forecast of future pro-
duction, and they also bid in the electricity market within their 
generation capacity, which is dependent on the availability of 
gas resources. The coordination efficiency of the two markets 
largely relies on the GFUs’ performance [5]. 
However, GFUs have access to only local information; thus, 
the optimality of the bids is not guaranteed [6]-[7]. Improper 
bids by GFUs will not only distort the resource allocation but 
also reduce the GFUs’ own profit. This problem is particularly 
serious when the gas or power network capacity is scarce and 
shared by multiple parties. The problem can be resolved by 
improved coordinated planning of the two systems [8]-[9]. 
However, a more realistic solution is to modify the current 
operation framework. Some coordinative dispatch and market 
clearing approaches have been proposed [10]-[15]. In [10]-[11], 
the authors assemble the gas network constraints into the op-
timal power flow (OPF) models, which results in complex 
nonlinear programming problems. The problems are solved 
using an evolutionary algorithm or the primal-dual interi-
or-point method. In [12], a Benders decomposition approach is 
applied and the nonlinear gas network constraints are decou-
pled from the unit commitment (UC) problem. The algorithm 
shows good efficiency. Similarly, a Lagrangian relaxation 
method and a fuzzy optimization approach are presented in [13] 
and [14]. Whereas the above papers only focus on steady-state 
scheduling, reference [15] analyzes the impacts of gas system 
dynamics, which should be considered in intra-day scheduling. 
In fact, GFUs can learn how to properly bid by trial and error 
if the status of the systems can be accurately predicted. The 
need for coordination is not urgent with well-experienced 
market players. However, the systems’ status becomes highly 
uncertain and a spontaneous efficiency enhancement becomes 
infeasible with a significant share of intermittent resources. 
Due to the underlying risks, investors are less incented to invest 
in GFU assets, which in turn impedes the improvement in 
system flexibility. Researchers have attempted to include the 
uncertainty into the above coordination approaches to address 
this problem. A stochastic-programming-based coordinative 
scheduling tool is presented in [16], in which wind power is 
described by scenarios. The model can also be formulated as 
interval [17] or robust optimization problems [18] by modeling 
the uncertainty using intervals or sets. Moreover, reference [19] 
shows that a strategic bidding strategy of GFUs can also be 
beneficial within the current market framework. 
Following the notion that scarce resources should be 
properly priced for more efficient allocation, this paper aims at 
developing a non-deterministic coordinated gas and electricity 
market (ND-CGEM) model for day-ahead (DA) clearing. The 
model is scenario-based and inspired by the studies on sto-
chastic electricity market clearing approaches [20]-[21]. The 
top priorities include that the GFUs should be free from 
guessing their future production or bearing the risks from the 
gas supply, and the value of sufficient and timely gas supply for 
the power systems should also be reflected in the gas market. 
Moreover, real-time (RT) scheduling of the gas loads is often 
impossible or rather costly because the loads are typically less 
flexible in terms of response time. Therefore, the schedule 
should be made in advance if some gas loads are to be shifted to 
reserve capacity for potential needs of the power system in a 
congested gas network. The above components will be re-
flected in the proposed model. In summary, the contribution of 
this paper is multi-fold: 
1) Electric power generation and gas supply are coor-
dinated in contrast to the current segregated prac-
tice. 
2) A coordinated market framework is proposed with 
effective pricing and market clearing mechanisms 
for both electricity and natural gas. 
3) The uncertainty of renewable energies such as wind 
and solar is included considering of the inherent 
heterogeneity of gas and electric supply/networks in 
terms of timescale and contractual arrangements.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in Sec-
tion II, we describe the concepts, assumptions and framework 
for the ND-CGEM. In Section III, we present the mathematical 
formulation and solution of the model. Cases studies are pre-
sented in Section IV, followed by the conclusions and discus-
sions in Section V. 
II. CONCEPTS, ASSUMPTIONS AND FRAMEWORK 
In a de-regulation environment, the DA electricity market is 
typically cleared by solving a security-constrained unit com-
mitment (SCUC) problem. Constrained system balance is the 
key feature of the SCUC, and the balance is modeled in terms 
of instantaneous power rather than energy (in DA market, “in-
stantaneous” typically means “hourly”). 
In contrast, the upstream natural gas market, is dominated by 
volume contracts. In other words, the concept of instantaneous 
balance does not apply. Although long-term contracts are still 
the most common type of contract, the share of spot and 
short-term gas trading has been increasing over the past 20 
years [22]. Short-term contracts offer the consumers greater 
flexibility than the traditional long-term take-or-pay contracts, 
reducing the cost of resource re-allocation and making the gas 
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market more synchronized to the electricity market. 
When gas network congestion is not common or the time 
criticality of the gas demands is low, the hourly gas balance is 
indeed not a major concern. However, according to the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, the competition between 
heating and electricity companies for gas has caused congestion 
in the pipelines, leading to delays and spikes in the price of 
electricity, particularly in winter [23]. A similar issue was 
reported by ISO New England [24]. When GFUs account for a 
significant share of power production, timely gas delivery 
could be crucial to the power system. Therefore, hourly gas 
balance and network limits should be considered. Network 
limits can also be resolved by deploying gas storage facilities 
[25]. However, those facilities are also costly, which motivates 
us to develop a framework that helps utilize the limited re-
sources in the most efficient manner. 
To provide electricity and other ancillary services, GFUs 
must compete with other gas loads, mainly heating loads, for 
the resources (gas suppliers and networks). Traditionally, res-
idential loads are assigned higher priority [26], whereas indus-
trial users may choose between firm and interruptible contracts 
(GFUs typically sign interruptible contracts because of their 
lower rate). The framework is intended to encourage the pro-
vision of flexibility by energy-intensive gas consumers.  
However, the categorization is rough and static, which is in-
flexible and occasionally leads to inefficiency. In fact, some gas 
loads, though with a relatively long response time, are actually 
well adjustable if informed with adequate lead time. Mean-
while, the flexibility provided by GFUs will be crucial when the 
power system experiences a large wind power fluctuation; 
therefore, the power system can be a less elastic gas consumer 
at particular times. However, such situations cannot be properly 
addressed by the existing market frameworks because there is 
no suitable channel for communicating such information dy-
namically and efficiently. GFUs are definitely not ideal chan-
nels because they do not have access to adequate information 
and the risks of participating in sequentially cleared gas and 
electricity markets provide false information and cannot en-
courage them to act as active coordinators. 
Instead of allocating resources following a pre-defined pri-
ority list, it could be more efficient to price and allocate them 
dynamically based on the supply and demand. However, a more 
sophisticated gas market is not sufficient because GFUs do not 
reflect all market dynamics; instead, they only represent a por-
tion of the generation portfolio. It is also strongly recom-
mended by PJM that operational information be shared be-
tween the two systems [27]. 
All of the above problems naturally lead to the development 
of a joint electric-gas market framework. In such a framework, 
(1) gas system resources are allocated considering the condition 
of the connected power system; (2) the GFUs no longer need to 
bid in both separate markets and are exposed to far fewer risks; 
and (3) all of the costs incurred in scheduling gas system re-
sources for the power system are modeled explicitly and do not 
have to be borne by the GFUs first and then transferred to the 
end users. Therefore, we propose an ND-CGEM model below. 
Before formulating the model, we list some basic assump-
tions. 
Assumption 1: The gas loads other than GFUs are catego-
rized into two groups: high-priority gas loads (i.e., residential 
loads and firm industrial loads) and low-priority gas loads (i.e., 
interruptible industrial loads). The priority is modeled based on 
elasticity. Whereas low-priority loads can be curtailed with a 
moderate amount of compensation, high-priority loads are 
nearly inelastic. 
Assumption 2: There is no RT natural gas market. Gas load 
schedules and network capacity reservation should be made at 
the DA stage. Moreover, the GFUs can have access to only  the 
gas supply within the reserved capacity. 
Assumption 3: Similar to the take-or-pay contract, there is a 
penalty for deviating from the DA gas contracts. 
Assumption 4: Only the uncertainty of wind power is mod-
eled in this paper. Although uncertainties from other sources 
can also been described jointly by the scenarios, we suggest that 
a trade-off be made between modeling accuracy and computa-
tional burden. 
III. ND-CGEM MODEL FORMULATION AND SOLUTION 
A. Overall design of the ND-CGEM model 
The ND-CGEM model is modeled as a stochastic pro-
gramming problem. The problem aims to minimize the ex-
pected costs of the entire system and to derive prices for the 
resources. Fig. 1 shows the overall design of the model. The 
single DA scenario represents the DA settlement, while the 
simulated RT scenarios are used to estimate the expected costs 
and are modeled in a similar manner as the DA one. 
 
Fig. 1. Overall design of the ND-CGEM model. 
Compared to the SCUC model which is typically a mixed 
-integer linear programming (MILP) problem, the non-convex 
gas system constraints make the model more complex. First, 
even when the integer variables are fixed, the optimization 
problem is still non-convex and does not have dual variables, 
without which the prices cannot be defined. Second, solving a 
mixed-integer programming with non-convex components 
other than integrality is extremely time consuming, particularly 
when the non-convex constraints are duplicated for multiple 
scenarios. This is unacceptable for practical use. Therefore, two 
modifications are applied to the model. (1) The non-convex gas 
system constraints are removed from the problem using the 
general Benders decomposition (GBD) technique. The 
non-convex constraints, if binding, will be represented by some 
linearized cuts generated by the sub-problems (as described 
below). (2) Instead of applying the gas network constraints to 
each of the RT scenarios, the constraints are used only to limit 
the network capacity allocated in the DA market (see Assump-
tion 2), and the RT gas consumption is simply constrained by 
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the booked capacity. 
B. Detailed formulation 
1) Objective function 
The objective function describes the out-of-pocket costs of 
the entire system, including the UC costs, fuel costs, gas load 
shedding costs, gas supply deviation fees and electric load 
shedding costs. The DA scenario is assigned a small weight 
(𝜌 ≪ 1). The objective function is formulated as 
   
   
   
   
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(1) 
where, the weight factors depend on the probability of each 
scenario satisfying ∑ 𝜌𝜔𝜔∈Ω = 1. The objective is subject to 
the following constraints. 
2)  Power system constraints 
   1 , / 1
U D
gt gt gtg t
v v v v g t T

       (2a) 
     1 , 1,min 1, , , / 1
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gt g gg t
v v v t t T T g t T           
 (2b) 
     1 1 , 1,min 1, , , / 1
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, , ,gt g gt gt gv P p v P g t     (3b) 
   
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(3e) 
Except for the logic relationship of the state variables and 
minimum on/off time limits (constraints (2a)-(2c)), all power 
system constraints are duplicated for all scenarios. Constraints 
(2d) and (3a) describe the system balance. Constraints (2e) and 
(3b) represent the maximum and minimum capacity of the units, 
respectively. Constraints (2f)-(2g) and (3c)-(3d) limit the units’ 
upward and downward ramping rates, respectively. Constraints 
(2h) and (3e) represent the transmission capacity limits. The 
piece-wise fuel cost functions 𝑓(∙)  are also modeled using 
constraints but are not explicitly presented here for simplicity. 
3)  Gas system constraints 
The gas system is typically represented by its steady-state 
and dynamic characteristics [28]. Considering that the market is 
cleared in an hourly manner, only the steady-state characteris-
tics are considered. However, the gas network models are still 
complex due to their non-convexity, which cannot be easily 
linearized as with the power transmission models. 
The models of gas suppliers and loads are straightforward. 
The gas output is limited by the supplier’s capacity. The gas 
loads have pre-defined profiles. The low-priority loads can be 
curtailed at low cost but only when informed in the DA market. 
The gas storage facilities are regarded as suppliers or loads 
because they do not frequently switch between the charging and 
discharging modes. The formulations are as follows: 
0 , ,jt ts S j t    (4a) 
0 , ,NG NGdt dtl L d t     (4b) 
0 , , ,jt ts S j t     (5a) 
, , ,NG NGdt dtl l d t      (5b) 
The gas transmission system usually consists of two major 
types of branches: pipelines and compressors. The gas flow in a 
pipeline is determined by the gas pressure at the two ends, 
diameter of the pipeline and temperature. While the gas pres-
sure is variable during operation, other factors are regarded as 
fixed and described by parameters [11]: 
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(6b) 
Compressors are deployed in the networks to compensate for 
the pressure loss. The gas flow through a compressor is jointly 
determined by the pressure at the two ends and the power, as 
well as other fixed factors: 
 
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2 2
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(7a) 
The power output of a compressor is limited by its upper and 
lower bounds, and it is assumed that a compressor consumes 
gas to generate power, which can be described by a quadratic 
function. 
c c cH h H   (7b) 
  2,2 ,1 ,0
com com com
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As discussed in Section II, the gas transmission constraints 
are computationally expensive and cannot be included in all 
scenarios. Hence, constraints (6)-(7) are applied only to con-
strain the booked capacity of the GFUs. Then, the gas system 
nodal balance constraints can be modeled as 
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(8a) 
Gas consumption by the GFUs in all DA and RT scenarios 
should be within the booked capacity, as presented by the fol-
lowing constraints: 
0 , ,nggt gtw x g G t     (9a) 
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(9d) 
where, constraints (9b) and (9d) represent the system gas bal-
ance for the DA and RT scenarios, respectively, to which the 
network limits are no longer applied. Considering that the gas 
consumed by the compressors is minor, the quantity for each 
scenario is approximated and assumed to be the same for all 
scenarios. 
3)  Power and gas coupling constraints 
The power and gas systems are coupled by the GFUs. The 
coupling constraints are modeled as 
 = ,ng nggt gtw f p g G t   (10a) 
 = , ,ng nggt gtw f p g G t    (10b) 
The fuel consumption of the GFUs is typically modeled us-
ing a quadratic heat rate curve [15] and piece-wise-linearized 
here. 
C. Solution 
The above model is a mixed-integer non-convex program-
ming problem with a linear objective function, to which the 
common commercial MILP solvers are not applicable. Alt-
hough there are some available non-convex programming 
solvers, they are designed for general purposes and usually of 
poor computational performance, which is unacceptable for a 
market clearing tool. Following the ideas of [12], the GBD 
method is used in this paper to solve the above problem. 
The strategy of the GBD method is divide and conquer. The 
MILP characteristic of the master problem is retained by iso-
lating the gas network constraints. The removed constraints are 
compiled as a series of feasibility check sub-problems. Linear 
cuts are generated if a feasibility check does not pass and then 
embedded into the master problem, guaranteeing that the 
market clearing results are at least a feasible solution. 
The sub-problem is formulated as follows: 
 
   
* * *
*
ˆˆmin , ,
ˆ
ng
NG NG NG
gt nt jt jt d dt
j J d D
gt gtg t
g G
x l s s l
x x
  

 


   
 
 

 
(11a) 
* ˆ0 ,jt jt ts s S j   s.t.  (11b) 
* ˆ0 ,NG NG NGdt dt dtl l L d      (11c) 
* ˆ0 ,gt gtx x g    (11d) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
* ˆ
ˆ ˆ 0
mnt jt jt c
m n j n c n
NG NG NG
dt dt dt gt
d n g n
y s s h
L l l x n

  
 
  
       
  
  ，
 
(11e) 
      and, Constraints (6)-(7)  
where, variables marked by “*” are given by the master problem; 
𝜂Υ(𝑔)𝑡 represents the value of natural gas to the power system, 
as implied by the locational marginal electricity price (LMEP), 
which is derived by solving the master problem: 
    /
e
gtg t g t
  
 
  (12a) 
where, the definition of 𝜂𝛶(𝑔)𝑡
𝑒  is as presented in Section III-D. 
Because the gas system constraints are not temporally coupled, 
the sub-problems are solved independently for each time pe-
riod.  
The sub-problems are non-convex, and global optimality is 
not guaranteed. As suggested by [12], a successive linear pro-
gramming (SLP) approach is effective for solving the problem. 
Alternatively, the linearized model can be used after an opti-
mum has been found by the interior-point optimizer. Readers 
may refer to [12] for the detailed algorithm. 
If the sub-problem returns a positive optimal objective value, 
a linear cut is generated as follows: 
   
 
 
 
* * * *
*
ˆ, ,
ˆ 0 :
NG L NG NG NG
gti nti jti nd nti dt dti
n N d n
GFU NG ng
ng nti gt gti i
n N g n
x l s B l l
B x x
 
 
 
 
    
  
 
 
 
(13a) 
where, 𝜇𝑁𝐺 is the dual variable of the correction constraints in 
the SLP model. To summarize, the market clearing model is 
solved following the procedures in Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 2. Procedures for solving the ND-CGEM model. 
D. Definition of the prices 
Consistent with the traditional locational marginal pricing 
method, the prices are defined based on the dual variables of the 
master problem, with the integer variables fixed at their opti-
mized values: 
, ,e sys e emt t mq qt
q Q
m   

    (14a) 
It is assumed that the gas suppliers in a system share the same 
gas cost and do not bid strategically. This assumption is made 
to simplify the spot market model and is a fair assumption 
because the gas prices are typically uniform within a specific 
range of area. Alternatively, arbitrage will occur to rebuild the 
equilibrium. Moreover, the gas network constraints are im-
posed only on the allocation of booked gas demand capacity. 
Thus, the gas prices are solely determined by the dual variables 
of constraints (9b): 
, ,ng sys ngnt t n    (15a) 
The power system as a whole must pay for the obtained gas 
capacity of the GFUs based on the capacity prices. The capacity 
prices are positive only when some low-priority loads are cur-
tailed to fulfill the power system (potential) demand. Otherwise, 
they are zero. Though the gas prices are uniform, the capacity 
prices are locationally discrepant, which is determined by the 
dual variables of the added cuts: 
, ,ng cap GFU NG ng nggt ng nti i
i I
B g G  

    (16a) 
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It could be controversial to price the gas capacity with the 
dual variables of the linearized cuts. However, it is a good 
approximation for the value of gas capacity. More sophisticated 
convexification approaches for the gas transmission network 
model might be helpful to improve the approximation. 
IV. NUMERICAL CASES 
A modified IEEE Reliability Test System [29] with 18 units 
(total capacity: 2,090 MW) and a 14-node gas transmission 
system with 3 gas suppliers (see Fig. 3) are used in this paper to 
demonstrate the performance of the proposed ND-CGEM 
framework. The model data of the two systems are provided in 
[30] and [31]. It is assumed that G3 and G13 are GFUs located 
at node 12 and 5 in the gas system, respectively. Without loss of 
generality, all gas loads are assumed to be 80% high-priority 
and 20% low priority. 
 
Fig. 3. 14-node gas transmission system. 
 
Fig. 4. Wind power forecast and generated scenarios. 
A wind farm with a capacity of 400 MW is located at bus 8. 
The wind power is assumed to follow a beta distribution, with 
the parameters estimated based on the historical data provided 
by [32] and scaled down to fit the test system. To simulate the 
RT scenarios, 5,000 samples are generated following the esti-
mated distribution and are reduced to 30 using the fast forward 
selection method [33]. Fig. 4 presents the wind power forecast 
and the associated scenarios of a specific day. 
The electricity market is traditionally cleared without con-
sidering the gas system. With the conventional SCUC tool, we 
can examine how the uncertainty of wind power impacts the 
schedules of the power system. Fig. 5 shows that for a specific 
day, the GFUs are committed for more periods when uncer-
tainty is considered, which implies that the power system relies 
on the GFUs’ capacity to firm the variability of wind power. 
However, as noted above, there are two underlying risks. 
First, the quantity of gas consumed by the GFUs is uncertain. 
Unless the GFUs are informed of all the market information, 
including the wind power forecasts and distributions, they are 
incapable of making efficient gas purchase contracts to mini-
mize the deviation penalties. Taking G3 as an example, Fig. 6 
demonstrates the total gas consumption and profiles of G3 
during the day in different scenarios. As indicated by the results, 
the GFUs are exposed to significant risks of deviation penalties 
even if the gas contracts are signed daily; needless to say, the 
hourly profile is even more volatile.    
 
Fig. 5. Impacts of wind power uncertainty on the GFUs’ schedules. 
 
Fig. 6. Natural gas consumption of G3 in the scenarios. 
 
Fig. 7. System gas load profile. 
 
Fig. 8. Unsatisfied natural gas demand of G3 in different scenarios. 
Furthermore, from Hour 17 to Hour 22, during which the 
GFU is heavily used is also a gas load peak on that day (see Fig. 
7). If the two systems are not coordinated, the gas loads will not 
be re-scheduled to reserve gas supply for GFUs to generate 
power and the GFU will suffer from insufficient gas supply (see 
Fig. 8), which means that the power system might have to 
commit more expensive resources or even curtail loads during 
RT operation. However, there could be potential overall social 
welfare improvement if such a shortage in gas supply for power 
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generation is predicted by electric-gas market coordination and 
the gas load is properly compensated for being curtailed. 
Therefore, running a joint optimization-based coordinated 
market is technically more effective than the non-coordinated 
market.  
 
Fig. 9. Gas supply capacity for the GFUs in the joint market compared to the 
maximum gas demand when the gas system is not considered. 
 
Fig. 10. Distribution of the overall gas supply deviation. 
TABLE I 
GAS LOAD CURTAILED BY THE ND-CGEM MODEL 
Gas node Load type Time period (h) Quantity (kcf/h) 
14 Low-priority 18 34.79 
13 Low-priority 19 84.66 
14 Low-priority 19 379.99 
It is assumed that the gas prices are $2/kcf at the gas sup-
pliers and that the costs of curtailing the low-priority and 
high-priority loads are $3/kcf and $1,000/kcf respectively. The 
option of shifting the loads across the periods is not considered 
but can be easily modeled within the framework. The 
ND-CGEM model is tested based on the above assumptions. 
Fig. 9 shows the capacity that is scheduled to the GFUs in the 
joint market compared to the maximum gas demand among the 
scenarios when the gas system is not considered. The increase 
in supply capacity for G3 from Hour 22 to Hour 23 is due to a 
re-balance of power output between G3 and G13. Although not 
all demands are satisfied, the ND-CGEM model does choose to 
curtail some of the low-priority loads (see Table I) to reduce the 
overall system costs. The prices of gas supply capacity for the 
two GFUs are also presented in Fig. 10. The results indicate that 
the gas capacity price is zero when there is no congestion in the 
gas networks. 
The joint cleared market can also help determine the optimal 
volume of DA gas supply contracts. As shown in Fig. 10, the 
deviations are distributed around zero, which helps the GFUs, 
i.e., the entire power system, reduce deviation penalties. 
The optimized expected overall cost of the gas and electricity 
system is $1,612,614, which is 0.19% higher than the overall 
cost when the two systems are not coordinated ($1,612,614). 
Although at a lower cost, the non-coordinated schedules are 
actually infeasible. To compare, an additional 1,000 wind 
power scenarios are generated to simulate the RT operation of 
the system under coordinated and non-coordinated DA sched-
ules. Fig. 11 shows the average system-wide RT LMEP among 
the simulated scenarios. The results indicate that the re-dispatch 
costs can be higher than expected without coordinating the DA 
schedules of the two systems. 
 
Fig. 11. Simulated average system-wide RT LMEP with coordinated and 
non-coordinated DA schedules. 
TABLE II 
EXPECTED AND SIMULATED SYSTEM-WIDE COST ($) 
Cases 
Expected cost 
(non-coordinated) 
Expected  
cost 
(ND-CGEM) 
Simulated cost 
(non-coordinated) 
Simulated 
cost 
(ND-CGEM) 
Simulated 
cost 
reduction 
1  1,672,320   1,674,809   1,714,020   1,676,839  2.2% 
2  1,533,726   1,533,726   1,546,916   1,547,040  0.0% 
3  1,557,054   1,558,423   1,575,033   1,566,549  0.5% 
4  1,661,755   1,664,132   1,686,451   1,666,506  1.2% 
5  1,516,533   1,516,533   1,522,264   1,522,292  0.0% 
6  1,672,320   1,674,809   1,714,020   1,676,839  0.7% 
7  1,533,726   1,533,726   1,546,916   1,547,040  1.3% 
8  1,557,054   1,558,423   1,575,033   1,566,549  0.0% 
9  1,661,755   1,664,132   1,686,451   1,666,506  0.6% 
10  1,516,533   1,516,533   1,522,264   1,522,292  1.5% 
TABLE III 
COMPUTATIONAL INFORMATION OF THE ITERATION PROCESS 
Iteration 1 2 3 4 
No. of sub-problem iterations 411 355 396 433 
Unsatisfied gas demand (kcf/h) 3022.95 95.32 0.53 0.00 
No. of generated cuts 4 2 1 0 
The simulation results for more days are presented in Table 
II. As expected, the non-coordinated approach always tends to 
underestimate the actual costs, whereas the ND-CGEM 
framework provides a better estimation. Moreover, the actual 
cost with the ND-CGEM approach can be 2% lower than the 
non-coordinated approach by making better DA schedules. The 
difference is minor when the gas network is not congested (e.g., 
cases 2, 5, 7 and 10). 
All of the cases are run on a laptop with a Xeon E3-1535M 
CPU and 16 GB of RAM. The optimization problems are 
solved using the commercial solver Gurobi 6.5. When the rel-
ative gap for the MILP problems is set at 10-4, the average 
solving time for the above cases is approximately 231 s, with 
1-5 outer-loop iterations. When the number of RT scenarios 
increases to 80, the time increases to approximately 411 s. 
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Table III shows the iteration process of a specific case. The 
number of sub-problem iterations indicates the overall number 
of SLP problems calculated for the 24-hour gas transmission 
feasibility problems. Further improvements in the algorithms 
might be helpful in applying the proposed framework to larger 
systems. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
This paper proposes and examines a framework of joint gas 
and electricity markets considering wind power uncertainty. 
With the ND-CGEM model, the GFUs are no longer responsi-
ble for making forecasts regarding future gas consumption to 
bid in the gas market considering natural gas-fired generation in 
the power system operation or bearing the risks of improper gas 
contracts and insufficient gas supply. Moreover, the gas 
transmission resources are better allocated. When the gas 
network capacity is urgently demanded by the power system, 
the joint market can help curtail some of the low-priority gas 
loads by compensating for the lost utility. The case studies 
indicate that better DA market clearing results can be achieved. 
The solution algorithm shows acceptable computational per-
formance, although further improvements might be needed 
when applying the framework to larger systems. The proposed 
stochastic marketing clearing framework can also be applied in 
a deterministic setting using only one scenario in the real-time 
market simulation.  
For future works, a convexification of the gas transmission 
network model might be helpful to overcome the local optimum 
of nonlinear sub-problems. Moreover, decomposition algo-
rithms can also be applied to the stochastic optimization prob-
lem to increase the computational efficiency. 
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